Washington, DC, May 21, 2014 – The Arusha Accords, a peace agreement signed in August 1993 between the Rwandan government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), have failed in the worst way that peace agreements can fail. Documents released today by the National Security Archive and the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum attest to the role of the international community in the non-implementation of the demobilization program, an important part of the Arusha agreements that eventually led to genocide in April 1994. The Arusha Agreement provides for the creation of the Implementation Monitoring Committee (ICN) with government representatives, representatives of rebel movements, the UN, the African Union and regional peace initiatives for Burundi. In particular, BMI was responsible for monitoring, monitoring, coordinating and effectively implementing all provisions of the agreement. The MSC will also provide guidance for the establishment of other commissions and subcommittees in accordance with the agreement. (a) The functions of the Ceasefire Commission on peace and security are as follows: in 2002, the IMC worked with the government on various laws, including on the freedom of action of political parties, provisional immunities, the law against genocide and the creation of a National Committee for Refugees and Victims (CNRS), etc. 7 One of the main achievements of the BMI was the ceasefire agreement of 2 December 2002. The U.S. Embassy in Rwanda reminds the Secretary of State of concerns about the transition to peace, particularly tensions over the demobilization process. Ambassador Rawson writes that « at the registered level, many equate multiparty and transitional government with their imminent demobilization, as most of the demobilized soldiers come from the ranks of enlisted soldiers. Their biggest concerns are adequate training and compensation as soon as they leave the military. Following the signing of an agreement with the CNDD-FDD on 2 November 2003, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in Burundi is expected to begin within 30 days. (k) The « Country » Sub-Commission must ensure fairness, transparency and common sense of all its decisions in the performance of its duties, with the exception of the announcement of the start of the demobilization of child combatants in January 2004, under the aegis of UNICEF. It must always be aware that the goal is not only the restoration of its ownership of returnees, but also reconciliation between groups and peace in the country.
There are those who argue that Rwanda should never have tried to have both a peace process and a process of democratization, because one allowed the other to take control of the situation. 5) The parties set up a joint commission for peace and security (`ceasefire commission`, responsible for peacekeeping and security functions and working closely with a peacekeeping force after the agreement came into force; The Arusha negotiations were compounded by the fact that the various divisions between the political parties occurred within the Rwandan government delegation. This is evident from various reports by American observers (document 8) and from the reports of the Rwandan delegation sent to President Habyarimana in Kigali (document 14). The major differences of opinion were the same: how to integrate the military, the size of the entire force and the shares of the RPF and former government forces that would constitute the new Rwandan armed forces (Document 9).